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Introduction 
The Persistence of Dwelling 
Grant Farred 
Cornell University   
 
Alfred J. Lopez 
Purdue University 
 
These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet he 
does not dwell in them, when to dwell means merely that 
we take shelter in them. 
Martin Heidegger, “Bauen Wohnen Denken” 
Residents of fifteen houses had been ordered to leave their 
little neighborhood on the edge of town. Twenty four 
hours, they were told, or else. “Else” meaning “die.” 
Toni Morrison, Home 
The decision to dwell, as Toni Morrison reveals in her novel Home, is always 
potentially fatal. To dwell is not merely to live in a house; a home might be a 
dwelling, but there is no guarantee that the “home” makes dwelling 
possible, that it does anything more than shelter humans. In fact, occupying 
a building has very little to do with dwelling. To dwell, on the other hand, is 
to come fully into oneself, to have thought oneself assiduously, exhaustively, 
in relation to that self. In this sense being only becomes possible in and 
through dwelling, in the act of making of the house or home a dwelling. To 
live in a house that does not permit dwelling due to whatever mechanism of 
oppression, whether political or cultural disenfranchisement or outright 
colonization or occupation, is to be homeless in a philosophical sense. Such a 
building stands as the visible index of that which suppresses or disables or 
forbids dwelling—the very emblem of homelessness. 
In Home Morrison identifies dwelling through an exceptional 
attachment to what might be named the living history of a family’s 
rootedness. Only one of the characters in Morrison’s Home refuses to leave 
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“their little neighborhood on the edge of town,” despite knowing full well 
the cost of his decision.1 This character, an “elderly man named Crawford,” 
chooses instead to face the white mob in his small Georgia town, to be 
beaten to death, bound to the “oldest magnolia tree in the county.”2 His 
former neighbors sneak back and bury him beneath that magnolia tree, 
which Crawford claimed his great-grandmother had planted. The tree, his 
terrified neighbors speculate, is the reason he could not leave: he was bound 
to it, bound by family history, bound by a love of that tree. Crawford’s 
choice is consistent with dwelling as what Heidegger calls volkstümlich, 
traditions that define individuals and peoples and that are, necessarily, 
steeped in blut [blood]. This blut in turn is what binds individuals to both a 
shared tradition and the land that both nurtured and maintains it. The 
systematic disenfranchisement or marginalization or, as in Crawford’s case, 
extermination of those who would otherwise dwell thus constitutes a denial 
of dwelling itself, the most visible marker of the oppressor’s violence. 
Thinking through 20th- and 21st-century fiction and film, this special 
issue casts in a postcolonial and global frame Heidegger’s question: What 
does it mean to dwell? More precisely, how do contemporary narratives 
address the question of dwelling? The epigraph from Heidegger that opens 
this essay would not have us confuse dwelling with merely inhabiting a 
space; to dwell in such spaces must mean more than “merely that we take 
shelter in them” (Heidegger 348).3 Likewise, and like Morrison’s Crawford, 
this special issue wants to think how to distinguish between occupying a 
house and truly dwelling. 
  This distinction between occupying a given space and identifying with 
a place is inextricable from even the most ancient civilizations, well 
predating 19th-century concepts of empire and the nation-state. Although 
Ernest Renan’s 1882 definition of the nation famously distinguishes it from 
the “republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and 
empires” of Western antiquity, even his dismissive description of “Egypt, 
China, and ancient Chaldea” as “flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of 
Heaven” concedes the self-identification of individuals with community and 
place.4 The emergence of dwelling as an indispensible part of both individual 
and collective consciousness and identity paradoxically coincides with its 
first great crisis under colonialism, and has become simultaneously more 
cherished and more besieged since the rise of modern imperialism. Empire 
brought unprecedented complexity to notions of home, dwelling, and 
belonging as it produced untold millions of diasporic and internally 
deracinated subjects, as well as the masses of settlers and voluntary 
occupiers required to establish and maintain it. Since the late 20th century the 
rise of globalization has further threatened traditional concepts of the nation 
and nationalism, but has neither lessened the desire to dwell or slowed the 
pace of uprooted and displaced individuals and peoples, a fact to which the 
ongoing global crisis of immigration amply testifies. 
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 The Heideggerian notion of dwelling, of course, finds itself rethought, 
re-envisioned and repurposed for the particular politics of the postcolonial 
moment; it becomes "different," in Derrida's sense, in the postcolonial. We 
can see this postcolonial rethinking of dwelling via the work of thinkers 
such as Said, who presents the Orient as the space and time of the Other 
subjected to such violence as to draw the very notion of dwelling into 
question.5 Heidegger shares this political concern, but of course with 
distinctly different preconceptions. The post-World War II argument for 
dwelling is complicated and threatened, Heidegger insists, by the specter of 
nuclear disaster; given the shared historical moment (the imminent end of 
European colonial dominance), this makes Heidegger’s view, if not entirely 
of a piece with the postcolonial agenda, then at least commensurate with it. 
This issue of the precarity of life (in Judith Butler's terms) of course returns 
to us, retooled for postcolonial use, in the work of Agamben, for whom the 
specter of the camp and zoe and bios articulates itself again, not simply in 
the camp’s preeminent construct, but more pressingly in the bare life that is 
postcoloniality.6 The question then becomes: Is the promise-filled (if difficult 
to achieve) prospect of dwelling possible—that is, thinkable—in the 
postcolonial? Or should dwelling be the first ground—the absolutely non-
negotiable first demand—for thinking the postcolonial? 
It is thus not to the oldest identifications of antiquity or the mass 
displacements of more recent centuries that this Special Issue directs its 
focus, but to the struggles of individuals in our own time. It is Crawford’s 
magnolia tree, Heidegger might suggest, that makes of his smalltown 
Georgia house a dwelling. Because it is a dwelling, because it is more than 
just a place to live, because it is the place where he can come into being, 
Crawford decides to face death in his dwelling even as his neighbors flee 
from the white vigilantes. He is certain that death is coming, is fully aware 
that he will die violently; but it is more important for Crawford to dwell 
until death, to dwell in death, than to live in some other building. Although 
he knows he may be safe elsewhere, dwelling will no longer be possible. 
 In this way Home continues Morrison’s preoccupation with dwelling, 
perhaps first glimpsed in Beloved’s 124 Bluestone Road, then in Paradise’s 
convent and the towns of Ruby and Paradise. Morrison, of course, is not the 
only author who thinks dwelling. One could, for example, offer David 
Malouf’s oeuvre, in which the land in its entirety functions as that colonized 
site, that place of intense violence, that is unfit for dwelling precisely 
because of the violence colonialism done to the Aboriginal community.7 We 
may also think of Peter Carey’s garret-like spaces, or V.S. Naipaul’s A House 
for Mr. Biswas or the haunted house that is Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms At 
Night; or the inhospitable, unhappy, wooded English suburban outpost that 
is David Mitchell’s wonderfully melancholy Black Swan Green.8 Recent 
American literature has also produced powerful meditations on home and 
dwelling, from the intense identifications of Junot Díaz’s and Louise 
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Erdrich’s characters with, respectively, Paterson NJ and the ancestral Ojibwe 
lands of North Dakota, to the deracinated protagonists of Dave Eggers’s 
What Is The What and Zeitoun, to Chris Ware’s meditation on the history of a 
century-old Chicago apartment building—and the many people who lived, 
dwelled, and died in it—in his landmark graphic novel Building Stories.9 Each 
of these texts problematizes concepts of dwelling in a global age, offering 
respective vistas into the present complexities of this oldest of human ideas. 
If, as Heidegger contends, dwelling requires attachment to a place we may 
call “home”—and thus to the corresponding customs and ways of being-in-
the-world—then we can read in these and many other such works the 
stakes, the hopes and fears, that come with such attachment to places. The 
literature of dwelling narrativizes the persistence of dwelling, of the desire 
to dwell; it pursues Heidegger’s questions in settings that unsettle dwelling, 
that threaten to render it precarious, perhaps impossible. But the desire, the 
imperative to dwell, persists. 
 If, as Lacan reminds us, desire is the subject’s entry into the 
symbolic—if it is, in fact, the subject’s originary cue to speak—that speaking 
subject inevitably articulates desire in the form of a demand. This in turn 
invokes a nomenclature, a language of dwelling, that encompasses but also 
transcends that of sovereignty or ownership or rights. Put another way: 
Who, at this moment in our history, is in a position to demand dwelling, and 
from whom? What agency, lawfully or not, holds the power to grant or 
withhold dwelling? Although Heidegger does not pose dwelling directly in 
terms of a demand in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” his exposition of the 
language of dwelling moves directly from bauen [to dwell] to “the German 
word Nachbar, neighbor…. he who dwells nearby.”10 The rest of the 
paragraph especially emphasizes dwelling as an activity done with others: 
“ich bin, du bist mean I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, 
the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is buan, dwelling.”11 
As we have written elsewhere, dwelling is thus immanent, not just 
broadly to Being, but more precisely to Being-with [Mitsein]. This dwelling 
as Being-with extends beyond our fellow humans to our inhabited 
environment, as it manifests in building [bauen]: “We do not dwell because 
we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, 
because we are dwellers.”12 That in turn requires not only the freedom to 
build [Freiheit], but the state of being at peace [Freide], because only those 
who can dwell in peace (“the free, das Frye”) are truly free to build. The 
common etymology of peace [Freide] and safety—for Heidegger the German 
“fry means preserved from harm and danger…safeguarded”—further 
confirms the relation between dwelling, building, and peace.13 Where these 
do not coincide in a given place, where Mitsein is denied to some or all of 
the populace, the very act of thinking dwelling—and especially of staking a 
claim to dwell—requires the courage to demand it. As we have written 
elsewhere, all of human history, and emphatically of the 500 years after 
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Columbus, consists of individuals and peoples making such demands, of 
dwellings disrupted, destroyed, demanded, sometimes achieved, but too 
often denied.14 
Each of the essays collected here presents one or more flashpoints or 
crises in a history of 20th- and 21st-century dwelling. The issue begins with the 
provocative opening line of Grant Farred’s essay “Letting-be: Dwelling, 
Peace and Violence in Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Petals of Blood”: “It is dwelling 
that allows mortals to initiate themselves in time and space.” This sentence 
serves as Farred’s point of departure for an exploration of how the fictional 
characters that populate Ngugi’s postcolonial Kanya struggle mightily with 
the task of “initiating themselves in time and space,” specifically in terms 
consistent with Heidegger’s fourfold (earth, sky, mortals, and “divinities”). 
The essay thus casts Ngugi’s romantic and rural—and thus deeply 
Heideggerian—vision as the crux of the characters’ struggle to dwell. The 
obstacles that prevent Ngugi’s villagers from dwelling in a modernizing 
postcolonial Kenya—or put another way, their inability or unwillingness to 
dwell in this new emergent environment—fuels the rising violence and 
tension that leads inexorably to a choice: between a Heideggerian dwelling, 
in peace with the fourfold, and a different, and profoundly ambivalent, 
existential state that Farred calls “letting-be.” This “letting-be” is not 
dwelling in the Heideggerian sense of an transcendent, immersive oneness 
with the earth, but a more precarious acceptance of the “polyvalent” nature 
(Farred’s term) of a life lived in an ascendant modernity that eschews the 
values of the fourfold. This “letting-be,” in Farred’s terms, “presupposes a 
radical openness to the fourfold – to the world – so that dwelling is best 
recognized as an intense understanding of how to be in the world, of what it 
means to be.” This is a state of dwelling that strives for peace, yet recognizes 
the upsurge of violence that accompanies—perhaps even stands as the price 
of—any such peace in a polyvalent society. It is an essay, in short, that 
responds otherwise to the question of whether dwelling remains a 
possibility at all in such an inauspicious, portentous time—where violence 
looms, peace is always, at best, precarious. 
 Nicola Tutek’s “Dwelling in the Apocalypse: Capitalist Modernity, 
Antimodernism, Zombies” shares and extends Farred’s reading of 
Heideggerian dwelling as a desire for peace as, Tutek’s words, “a condition 
of possibility of the escape from modernity's plight.” The essay’s larger 
agenda is a reading of Heideggerian dwelling as a profoundly anti-
modernist critique, which Tutek unfolds via a series of narrowing points of 
analysis. These proceed through an overview of the narratives of apocalypse 
that exposes a shared “eschatological anxiety” toward modernity and—
more importantly for Tutek’s purposes—a latent desire that implicitly 
emerges in apocalypse’s potential erasure and rebooting of civilization: the 
end as new beginning, “but at the price,” Tutek notes, “of a wholesale 
abandonment of modernity.” Tutek further narrows his focus to the zombie 
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apocalypse as “the preferred apocalyptic scenario of the post-Cold War era,” 
less a cautionary tale (as it perhaps functioned in earlier incarnations) than a 
collective anti-modernist fantasy. The zombie apocalypse’s greatest 
advantage over competing end-of-the-world scenarios, consistent with the 
Heideggerian romance of dwelling, is its efficacy as what Peter Paik calls 
“an extended thought experiment about the reconstitution of community life 
under conditions of severe privation and perpetual danger.”15 The latter half 
of Tutek’s essay reads serial TV program The Walking Dead as precisely just 
such a “thought experiment,” one that moves well beyond its putative main 
attractions (zombies and post-apocalyptic survivalism) into a extended 
meditation on the possibilities for human dwelling in a markedly 
antimodern and post-capitalist world—“not as a punishment,” as Tutek 
explains, “but as a redemption.” 
 Through its insouciant social history of beards, Russell Cobb’s “The 
Bearded Ones: Dwelling in a History of Radicalism, Authenticity, and 
Neoliberalism” casts the previous essays’ critiques of the romance of 
Heideggerian dwelling in a trenchantly postmodern mode. Cobb piquantly 
exposes both the beard’s apparent “disdain for the artifices of modernity, 
marketplace, and utilitarianism” and its rendering, via its symbolic 
overdetermination, as “a symbolic gesture toward an ahistorical 
authenticity” that belies its own eschatological anxieties of dwelling in a 
global age. The essay pursues this dual examination of the beard’s bid for 
authenticity and its eventual commodification as cultural and fashion 
accessory through a condensed history of its significations, lingering 
tellingly on the figure of the bearded radical/rebel and its successive 
appropriations. Key to Cobb’s genealogy are the heteronormative sexual 
mythology of the Castro-era barbudo and that figure’s symbolic 
overdetermination by the Whitmanesque-via-Lorca “queer beard,” a 
untenable binary brought to crisis by Ginsburg’s beardedness in 
revolutionary Cuba. What was, for Cobb, arguably the apotheosis of 20th-
century beardedness has since devolved under neoliberalism to a marketing 
(“branding”) tool, one that remains richly suggestive of an anti-modern 
authenticity that has lost what may once have been any (univocal) 
significatory power (e.g., the “hipster” or “lumbersexual” beard). What was, 
in effect, once the hallmark of a radical, ruralized, masculine authenticity 
stands now as what Cobb aptly calls bodily “green-screens” that any man 
can build, but in which none can really dwell. 
Anthony Ramos grounds his essay, “Sketching an Ontography of La 
Mara Salvatrucha: Radical Homelessness and Postglobal Subjects,” in the 
lived experience La Mara, a once LA-based gang of Honduran immigrants 
that has morphed into an international crime cartel—arguably the world’s 
first globalized gang. But in the larger ontographic logic of Ramos’s essay, 
the signifier “gang” is prefigured by an entire genealogy of such 
constructs—the “born criminal,” the “outlaw,” the “rebel,” Marx’s 
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“lumpen”—that states have deployed to essentialize the criminal and 
position him beyond the pale, beyond any possibility of dwelling within 
modernity. For La Mara, it is the state, in its power to discursively “fix” 
them as undesireables, which holds the power to deny dwelling. Legislation 
such as California’s STEP (Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention) 
Act of 1988 affirms that gangs have no place in the neoliberal state; their 
very ability, as Ramos notes, “to assemble and, in Heideggerian terms, dwell 
within a community is in-and-of-itself a threat to the state.” The essay 
continues its ontographic reading that encompasses not only Heidegger’s 
formulations of dwelling but Marx’s early but definitive characterization of 
the lumpenproletariat—that sector of the population he considered beyond 
the reach of redemption through class struggle. But Ramos also reads La 
Mara as a unique challenge to the new global order, because they owe their 
existence and growth to the very neoliberal policies intended to remove 
them from a globalizing Los Angeles not only through domestic legislation 
but also via deportation—thus enabling La Mara’s spread as an international 
rogue organization. Despite La Mara’s metastacization, they remain, in his 
reading, among those postglobal discontents targeted for ontological and 
political abjection. Such peoples are, he tells us, “radically homeless because 
they are out-of-place, without a home in the ontologies with which we 
imagine and construct our social worlds.” This radical homelessness, as the 
essay’s close reading of the 2009 film Sin nombre [Nameless] reveals, is a 
denial of dwelling on a mass scale, an “ontological homelessness often 
inscribed on the bodies we find morally repulsive.” By documenting the 
struggles of protagonists operating within a world that builds for others but 
not for them, director Cary Joji Fukunaga confronts viewers with the plight 
of other unknown millions who remain “sin nombre” (nameless), those 
postglobal subjects for whom dwelling is foreclosed because of a new world 
order that defines the parameters of the human precisely by parsing them as 
undesirable. 
Ethan Mannon’s “Precluded Dwelling: The Dollmaker and Under The 
Feet of Jesus as Georgics of Displacement” extends Ramos’s analytic of 
radical homelessness by reading displacement, the defining characteristic of 
Arnow’s and Viramontes’s respective novels, as a denial of dwelling. 
Specifically, Mannon’s close readings trace both the persistence of the desire 
to achieve rootedness—in in short, to dwell—and its impossibility, through 
the lens of the georgic mode, a global literary tradition defined by its rural 
vision of labor (as cultivation) and/as dwelling. For Mannon, however, the 
georgic ideal operates only ironically in Arnow’s and Viramontes’s modern 
exemplars, serving to affirm its pursuit as both worthy and doomed. Its 
comparative reading of an Appalachian and a Chicano text further expand 
this Special Issue’s narrative palette, casting the desire to dwell as one that 
transcends racial, identitarian, and historical differences. 
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It is precisely through race, identity, and history that this Special 
Issue’s closing essay, Scott Astrada’s “History and Dwelling: Re-examining 
Race and Identity through Octavia Butler’s Kindred and Paul Beatty’s The 
Sellout,” returns to our central question of dwelling in a global age. 
Acknowledging the urgency of reformulating the question in the absence of 
a totalizing postcolonial or postmodern master discourse, Astrada reframes 
Heideggerian dwelling through his close reading of two contemporary 
African-American novels that nevertheless bring broader ontological 
implications to bear on the (im)possibility of dwelling, not only in space, but 
in time. Each novel features a protagonist “attempting to find their place in 
the world,” against the background of both a history and lived experience of 
slavery. At stake, as it is for so many who would dwell but cannot, is the 
imposition of a colonial ideology and ontology upon the subaltern, fueling 
the self-alienation that Astrada elegantly describes as “a blurring of the line 
of self and other in the very dwelling space of the subject.” For Butler’s 
Dana, this means dwelling in a space that is overdetermined by a history she 
is forced to relive and relearn; in Beatty’s The Sellout, the protagonist, 
identified only as “Me,” counterintuitively asserts his agency by attempting 
to reinstate slavery in his hometown, an act that Astrada reads as 
“rethinking—and seemingly discarding—notions of metaphysical essence 
surrounding historical identity.” Each novel, in short, variously reconfigures 
the question of dwelling as a Being not only with-others in the present 
moment, but with untold numbers of others in remembered and 
unremembered time. 
Both the essays collected here and the narratives they explore leave us 
in a place much akin to what Heidegger finally determines as “the plight” of 
dwelling: “that mortals search ever anew for the essence of dwelling, that 
they must ever learn to dwell.”16 In Heidegger’s time as in ours, the future of 
the possibility of dwelling is as precarious as the desire for it is persistence. 
“In the very depth of misfortune,” Heidegger tells us, “they wait for the 
weal that has been withdrawn.”17 It is the persistence of a perhaps impossible 
demand that, perhaps inexplicably, endures in the face of all obstacles. 
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